City Taxes Subsidize Luxury Housing

If you want to know where the New York City government’s housing priorities lie, look no further than the beneficiaries of a housing subsidy program that costs the city over $300 million each year, and is considered a mainstay of real-estate development as much as bricks and brownstone were a century ago. Where does this money go?

Here’s a hint: The money doesn’t go to the New York City Housing Authority, which runs the nation’s largest public-housing system, providing homes to over 400,000 New Yorkers, most of whom couldn’t afford housing in the private market. For that, the city kicks in a whopping zero dollars per year.

In 2001, then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani stopped providing operating subsidies for public-housing developments that the city built, which are ineligible for federal funds. Mayor Michael Bloomberg has followed that practice. In 1998, under then-governor George Pataki, New York State eliminated funding for public housing it had built, and Pataki’s Democratic successors, Eliot Spitzer and David Paterson, did not renew the funding.

This has cost NYCHA an estimated $93 million a year and forced the authority to spread diminishing federal subsidies thinner, leading to reduced services and massive deficits. Its debt load is now over $500 million. The city also bills NYCHA $73 million for police services and $23 million for payments in lieu of property taxes each year, further crippling the agency’s budget.

Need another clue? The money doesn’t fund the city’s programs for the homeless. The entire budget for the city’s Department of Homeless Services is currently $84.7 million, including city and non-city funds. Mayor Bloomberg has in fact tried to gain additional revenue by charging homeless people with jobs up to half of their incomes as “rent” for the privilege of staying in shelters.

Who does the $300 million-plus program serve? The money goes to landlords of newly constructed rental buildings, and to purchasers of newly built coop and condo apartments—largely in luxury, market-rate developments—in the form of property tax exemptions. It’s called the 421-a program, and it was created in 1971 to encourage new construction in New York City on vacant land and on properties with buildings smaller than what zoning laws allowed.

How 421-a works

Local property taxes are based on a property’s “assessed value.” A vacant lot or a low-rise structure is worth a lot less than a new, high-rise luxury residential building, so when a new structure is created and the property’s value rises dramatically, its property-tax bill also rises. However, developers can avoid paying the full tax bill by opting into the 421-a program, which phases in the increased tax rate over decades. New York City’s Independent Budget Office offers this example: “If a parcel valued at $1 million when vacant is worth $10 million after construction, the $9 million increase in value is not taxed during the exemption period.” Through the 421-a program, developers of new residential buildings can pay a tax rate that for many years does not reflect the property’s increased value.

In theory, this encourages development on underdeveloped land. The program was created at a time when new construction in New York City was virtually stagnant, and the city’s population was declining by tens of thousands per year, as middle- and upper-income households were fleeing to the suburbs. In practice, it’s not clear that 421-a has even served a basic economic-development goal, as new construction patterns have followed trends of population growth and increased demand, not subsidies. A 2007 report by Habitat for Humanity and the Pratt Center for Community Development found that “the benefits of the 421-a program go primarily toward development in established neighborhoods and when the market is already strong.”

Owners get generous tax exemptions with little expected of them in return. Landlords of rental buildings who receive 421-a benefits have to enter apartments into the rent-stabilization system while receiving the tax break. Most developers happily oblige, for two reasons: First, as soon as the tax breaks expire, the rent-stabilized apartments can be automatically deregulated. Second, landlords get to set the initial rents—which are as high as the market can bear, even tens of thousands of dollars per month. Those units in the rent-stabilization system temporarily are subject to an additional 2.2 percent increase above what the Rent Guidelines Board sets, to compensate owners as the tax breaks diminish. Condo and co-op developments are also eligible to participate, with the individual buyers getting the tax exemptions.
In the program’s early years, participating developers in any part of the city could phase in property taxes over a decade, getting a full abatement for the first two years, an 80 percent exemption after two years, 60 percent after four years, and so on.

In 1985, the 421-a program was modified by creating an exclusion zone, roughly between 14th and 96th streets in Manhattan. Within that area, developers had to create small amounts of affordable housing to get the 421-a tax breaks. One way, usually called the “80/20 program,” was temporarily reserving 20 percent of the units in their developments for lower-income families, and in exchange getting a longer 421-a tax abatement. The other was building purely luxury developments in prime Manhattan locations and purchasing negotiated “certificates” for roughly $12,000 to $15,000 per unit, which developers in other parts of the city would use to help build below-market housing. As four or five certificates were required to finance each unit of lower-rent apartments in other neighborhoods, this did not create much affordable housing. In all cases, the lower-priced units are only affordable for a limited period before the rents go up to market rate.

A 2006 report from the New York City Comptroller’s office showed that in Manhattan, the 421-a 80/20 program had created approx imately 2,100 “affordable” units, with a projected future cost to the city of over $520,000 per unit—­over $1 billion of lost revenue in total, not including the subsidies landlords had already received. The report also found an additional 7,675 units receiving subsidies through the certificate program.

Not only is this an incredibly inefficient way to subsidize lower-rent units, but as is true across the spectrum of government-sponsored housing programs today, the definition of “affordable” is itself a problem. Most of the “affordable” units built through the 421-a program are targeted at 60 percent of the area median income, which works out to a rent of $1,150 a month for a family of four.

In 2007, when the 421-a program came up for renewal, some legislators pushed for a major revamping of its guidelines. A New York Observer article that year said that the program had come to “symbolize the government’s complicity in gentrification,” as it created incentives for developers to demolish low-rise structures and erect luxury towers in their place. When the political wrangling was over, proposals to remake 421-a into an affordable-housing program were significantly weakened, but some modifications made it through. The exclusion zone was expanded to include all of Manhattan and select areas in the other boroughs. Within the exclusion zones, the certificate program was ended, so affordable units had to be built on-site. The lower-priced units would have to stay in the rent-stabilization system for 35 years—longer than previously required—but time-limited affordability, one of the most disastrous failed housing policies in the city, remained.

The 2007 modifications did not address the 421-a program’s fundamental flaws. The majority of developments already receiving 421-a benefits are outside of Manhattan in areas that weren’t included in the expanded exclusion zones. The 2007 Habitat/Pratt Center report found significant activity in such neighborhoods, such as $5.7 million per year in tax exemptions for developments in Brighton Beach and Sheepshead Bay in Brooklyn, and $3.8 million per year for developments in Flushing, Queens. They found an 87-unit condo building in Corona, Queens, that would cost the city $14.5 million in lost revenues over the life of its 421-a tax exemption.

Even within the exclusion zones, where developers are required to provide a handful of lower-priced units, the question becomes: At what cost? The billions in lost tax revenue from the 421-a program could go a lot further through other initiatives to create housing that’s permanently affordable to people who are truly low-income. Instead, while a few thousand units are made temporarily affordable to people of modest means, the true beneficiaries of 421-a are really the developers of luxury rental buildings, and the purchasers of new condo and coop developments, who catch a break on the city’s dime.

You too could have benefited from a property-tax exemption if you had bought an $8.1 million six-bedroom home at 635 West 42nd Street, an $11.8 million pad at 8 Union Square South, or new digs at 207 East 57th Street for $15 million—all condos in recently constructed developments that participated in the 421-a program.

You could even make a career out of shaking down the government, like Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein. After helping to push the global economy to the brink of collapse, Goldman Sachs took over $20 billion in government money in various bailout schemes. Less publicized is the bailout that Blankfein received on his $27 million condo at 15 Central Park West. As the building, opened in 2007, participates in the 421-a program, he and his neighbors will pay a reduced property taxes for years to come.

The 421-a program also obscures the crisis in affordable housing caused by vacancy decontrol. Official statistics on the number of rent-regulated units in New York City do not differentiate between rent-stabilized apartments built before 1974­—most of which still rent for under $1,000­—and the newer apartments that are temporarily rent-stabilized at rents as high as $10,000. That inflate s the number of rent-regulated apartments remaining, making it difficult to quantify the rate at which we’re losing our truly affordable housing.

It’s scandalous enough that the 421-a program starves the city of resources that it could use to serve the truly needy, in order to benefit wealthy developers. But tenants have particular reason to be enraged. The state Legislature has readily extended the 421-a program while shafting tenants when it comes to rent-law reforms. When the 421-a law came up for renewal in 2007, the modified bill passed the Assembly unanimously, and it flew through the state Senate with only two dissenting votes. Meanwhile, the Senate for decades has blocked much-needed legislation to end vacancy decontrol in rent-regulated apartments, protect tenants in former Mitchell-Lama and project-based Section 8 buildings, let New York City set its own rent regulations, and close other loopholes in the rent laws.

The 421-a program expires next month. It would need to be renewed in order for developers to receive this benefit for new buildings. Six months later, in June 2011, the rent-control and rent-stabilization laws that over 2.5 million New Yorkers depend on to afford their homes also expire. They need to be renewed. The 421-a program costs the city millions in lost revenue; rent regulation stabilizes neighborhoods, families, and the general economy, and it costs the government virtually nothing.

If the 421-a law is not renewed, it won’t cut off tax exemptions for anyone already receiving benefits, nor will it strip protections from any tenant living in these buildings already. Letting it expire would simply discontinue this costly program for new developments. The rent-regulation laws, on the other hand, are a lifeline for millions of New Yorkers. The weakening of these laws in recent years has led to the loss of an estimated 300,000 once-affordable units.

In 2009 and 2010, the state Senate was unable to deliver on a single piece of long-promised pro-tenant legislation. At a time of crippling budget deficits, when vital services are being slashed, will lawmakers rush to support tax breaks for luxury buildings—while deferring action on bills to protect our rent-regulated housing stock?

Call your Assembly and Senate representatives and tell them: Unless you can pass pro-tenant legislation in the Real Rent Reform package first, don’t renew the 421-a law at all.